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Abstract 
The pragmatic notion of assertion has an important 
inferential role in logic. There are also many notational forms 
to express assertions in logical systems. This paper  reviews, 
compares and analyses  languages with  signs for assertions, 
including explicit signs  such as Frege’s and Dalla Pozza’s 
logical systems and implicit signs with no specific sign for 
assertion,  such as Peirce’s algebraic and graphical logics and 
the recent modification of the latter termed Assertive Graphs. 
We identify and discuss the main ‘points’ of these notations  
on the logical representation of assertions, and evaluate their 
systems from the perspective of the philosophy of logical 
notations. Pragmatic assertions turn out to be useful in 
providing intended interpretations of a variety of logical 
systems.  
Keywords: Logical notations• Assertion • Pragmatic Logic • 
Existential Graphs • Assertive Graphs 
1. Introduction 
The pragmatic notion of assertion plays a key role in different logical systems both 
explicitly and implicitly. Frege’s Begriffsschrift, Peirce’s Existential Graphs and 
Heyting’s explication of intuitionistic logical constants are examples of such 
pragmatically motivated approaches. The aim of the present paper is to consider the 
key pragmatic and notational aspects of a couple of logical systems: (i) Those  that 
explicitly express logical assertions by introducing a specific sign for assertion, in 
particular (a) Frege’s logical system and (b) Dalla Pozza’s pragmatic logic (LP); and (ii) 
those  in which no specific sign for assertion is introduced, in particular (c) Peirce’s 
Existential Graphs (EGs) and (d) its recent  variant of Assertive Graphs (AGs), in 
which assertions play a crucial inferential role even though the languages themselves 
exhibit no explicit signs of assertion.  
From historical, notational and logical points of view, one encounters the 
following ‘points’ regarding logical facets of assertions and assertive signs (see 
Pietarinen and Bellucci 2017 for more details on the first three): 
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(i) The Geach Point:1 One and the same proposition can occur both asserted 
and unasserted in different contexts. (Geach 1965) 
In particular, Geach (1965, p. 449) pointed out that “[a] thought may have just 
the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a proposition may occur in 
a discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same 
proposition”. A standard example is the justification of the inferential rule of modus 
ponens: assuming α → β and α, one infers β. In the minor premise, α is usually 
considered asserted, while in the major premise, α is not asserted, because it is the 
conditional α → β that is asserted (on this, see Russell 1903). This means that the 
very same proposition may be used both in its asserted and unasserted forms.2 
 Second, we can identify 
(ii) The Dudman Point: The distinction between asserted and unasserted 
propositions should be notationally distinguished, whatever form the notational 
expression of this difference happens to take. (Dudman 1950) 
This point has a long history. In a letter to Frege, Peano wrote that the various 
positions that a formula can have determines whether it occurs asserted or 
unasserted in some truth-functional context that is asserted. In particular, in Peano’s 
words, “the several positions that a proposition can have in a formula completely 
determine what is asserted of it” (Peano 1958 [1895], p. 191). In reference to Peano’s 
logical approach, Frege observed that this is because “the principal relation sign 
invariably carries assertoric force” (Frege 1991 [1897], p. 248) without any specific 
sign for assertion being present in the notation. This means that in Peano’s notation 
it is impossible to write down a complex formula that would show the difference 
between asserted and unasserted uses of the formula. And this, in turn, leads one to 
(iii) The Frege Point: Assertion must be represented by a specific logical sign 
(Frege 1879). 
According to the Frege Point, an ad hoc sign of assertion is a notational 
requirement of the logical language. Frege indicates it with “⊦”, which stands for the 
sign of assertion (see Section 2). (Nowadays, the sign “⊦”, is commonly termed the 
turnstile and it expresses the concept of derivability or provability.)  
A further perspective to the logic of assertions was given in terms of  
(iv) The Reichenbach Point: Assertions cannot be iterated and they cannot be 
connected by truth-functional connectives (Reichenbach 1947). 
Reichenbach (1947, p. 346) argues for this from the fact that the term 
“assertion” is used in three different ways. Namely, “it denotes, first, the act of 
asserting; second, the result of this act, i.e., an expression of the form ‘⊦ p’; third, a 
statement which is asserted, i.e. a statement ‘p’ occurring within an expression ‘⊦ p’”. 
Regarding the result of an assertion, Reichenbach claims that “since assertive 
expressions are not propositions, they cannot be combined by propositional 
operators” (Reichenbach 1947, § 57, p. 337). The assertion sign works, according to 
 
1 In the literature this is also known as the Frege-Geach Point or just as the Frege Point. 
2 Bell (1979) comments Russell’s views on modus ponens in the following way: “Now this would 
imply that either all inferences of the form modus ponens (to take but one example) are invalid, or, at 
least, that all those with either a true antecedent or a true consequent in the conditional premiss are 
invalid. This is, of course, quite unacceptable” (pp. 87-88). On the possibility of reconciling Russell’s views 
on modus ponens without facing Bell’s untoward consequences, see the justification of modus ponens in 
pragmatic logic provided by Chiffi and Di Giorgio (2017) based on the Bridge Principle (d) given in Section 
2.2 of the present paper. 
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Reichenbach, in its “pragmatic capacity”, since it cannot be, for instance, negated 
with a propositional connective. And if so, then inferences can be understood as 
processes that allow us to derive justified asserted conclusions once the asserted 
premises are also justified.  
This means that there can be no nested or iterated occurrences of the assertion 
sign, because the truth-functional connectives only operate on propositions and 
never on judgments. Furthermore, inferences operate only on assertions and never 
on propositions. So even though we have named this point “The Reichenbach Point”, 
it also has manifest Fregean roots.3 
 Fifth, we can identify the following point, which we term 
(v) The Elementary-restriction Point: No one connective (of any sort) is ever 
applied to two different assertions. 
This is to say that an asserted formula is elementary if it cannot be connected 
by any other (non-truth-functional) connective. This means that an elementary 
assertion is composed by a unique assertion sign prefixed to the asserted content. 
This is, for instance, the case with Frege’s Begriffsschrift. A similar restriction is 
presented in Reichenbach’s treatise, in which it underlies the distinction between 
assertions and (propositional) content:  
[T]wo assertive expressions in sequence do not represent a conjunction of 
these expressions. Rather we must say that juxtaposition of two assertive 
expressions amounts to the same as assertion of the conjunction of the two 
respective statements. Thus the sentences in a book, each asserted by the 
period sign, follow one another; this arrangement amounts to the same as 
asserting the conjunction of all these sentences, each taken without the 
assertion sign. Juxtaposition, therefore, constitutes the pragmatic analogue of 
conjunction. The other binary operations do not have such analogues. 
(Reichenbach 1947, p. 338) 
The conjunction of assertions is thus expressed as the assertion of the conjunction, 
since there is in Reichenbach’s picture no way to connect genuine assertions with 
one another, even with non-truth functional connectives.  
There are two marked implications from this. On the one hand, Reichenbach is 
able to clarify why juxtaposition is a pragmatic analogue to the propositional 
conjunction (as a kind of pragmatic connective among assertions). On the other 
hand, he assumes that the pragmatic conjunction can be formalised as the assertion 
of a conjunction (of propositions), not as a conjunction of assertions. The latter is 
only possible for conjunctive connectives, as there the equivalence between the 
assertion of conjunction and the conjunction of assertions holds. Indeed, 
Reichenbach cannot directly express the conjunction of assertion (by means of the 
juxtaposition of assertions). He can only express the equivalent assertion of a 
conjunction. Moreover, he cannot express, for instance, the disjunction of assertions, 
which is usually assumed to be a different case from the assertion of a disjunction 
(of propositions). 
Given such conundrums, a number of other, non-classical and variant systems 
of logic have been proposed which might well be more appropriate for the 
 
3 Frege holds this point only since the Begriffsschrift (see the next section). 
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representation of assertions. Let us highlight the following general point from one of 
them next, termed 
(vi) The Dalla Pozza Point: Complex assertions may be logically combined by an 
application of intuitionistic-like connectives. (Dalla Pozza 1991) 
This states that complex asserted formulas may be expressed by means of 
connectives that explicate intuitionistic meanings of logical constants, the behaviour 
of which is not truth-functional. Moreover, intuitionistic connectives can indicate the 
(pragmatic) justification-conditions for (acts of) assertions. 
This paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 provides an analysis 
of Frege’s assertion sign and its use in pragmatic logic. Section 3 is devoted to the 
investigation of the role of pragmatic assertions in two diagrammatical systems, 
namely Peirce’s Existential Graphs (EGs) and its recent modification termed Assertive 
Graphs (AGs). Section 4 proposes a critical comparison regarding the inferential role 
of assertions in the aforementioned logical systems, and Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Some Citation Examples 
2.1.  Frege’s Assertion Sign        
Frege’s assertion sign “⊦” is a pivotal element of his logical notation. This sign is 
placed before a content 𝜟𝜟 to express the fact that a complete judgement is the case: 
⊦ 𝜟𝜟. A judgement is understood as the internal counterpart of the act of assertion. 
The assertion sign is not intended by Frege to be a primitive one, since it is assumed 
to be composed by the vertical “|” and the horizontal “—” strokes. The vertical stroke 
is also known as the judgement stroke5. The interpretation of the assertion sign, its 
two constituents and the asserted content is not something that came to be fixed in 
Frege’s writings (Bell 1979). 
In the Begriffsschrift, 𝜟𝜟 stands for a conceptual content that can be judged, — 
𝜟𝜟 represents a thought, and ⊦ 𝜟𝜟 indicates a full judgement which Frege believed to be 
the common predicate of all judgements saying “it is a fact”. The idea is that a 
possible content (with a propositional nature) 𝜟𝜟 is converted by the horizontal 
stroke into a nominalisation (e.g., converting a proposition α into an expression of 
the form “that α”). By the vertical stroke one may predicate that the judgement 
expresses a fact (e.g., “it is a fact that α”). As noted by Geach, given this Fregean 
notation, it is now possible to differentiate asserted from non-asserted occurrences 
of one and the same formula.  
Frege’s views on the assertion sign in the Begriffsschrift suffer from some 
problems, as discussed in Dudman (1970) and Bell (1979). His proposal does not 
explain well the use of formulas in the context of indirect proofs that are assumed 
rather than asserted as true. Also, the interpretation of the assertion sign as a 
predicate critically violates what we have called the “Reichenbach Point”: assertion, 
which is a pragmatic notion, cannot be reduced to the semantic notion of a predicate 
that designates a fact. 
 
5 On the Fregean notion of judgement, see (Schaar 2018; Smith 2009). 
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Subsequently, then, Frege in the Grundgesetze and in “Function and Concept” 
modified his views on the assertion sign, holding a more coherent perspective. In a 
footnote to “Function and Concept”, Frege indeed noticed that:  
[T]he judgement stroke cannot be used to construct a functional expression; 
for it does not serve, in conjunction with other signs, to designate an object. ‘2 
+ 3 = 5’ does not designate [bezeichnet] anything; it asserts something. (Frege 
1997, p. 142 n). 
Now, the horizontal stroke is a function-name denoting a concept under which the 
True falls, while the judgement stroke is the acknowledgement of the truth of the 
Thought. So, —𝜟𝜟 means that 𝜟𝜟 can be presented without asserting its being true. In 
this way, also the premise of an indirect proof need not be put forth assertively, but 
for instance, can merely be assumed and put forth in a hypothetical form. 
Even if it is a well-known fact that in the beginning of “Der Gedanke” Frege 
classically defines logic as the science that is specifically concerned with the notion 
of truth, in his Posthumous Writings he pointed out that the notion of assertion is 
intimately associated with the nature of logic: 
[W]hat logic is really concerned with is not contained in the word ‘true’ at all 
but in the assertoric force with which a sentence is uttered. (Frege 1915, p. 
323) 
Indeed, the pragmatic notion of assertoric force ends up as being a crucial element 
of logicality in Frege’s mature reflections. 
 
2.2   Assertion in Pragmatic Logic  
Wittgenstein (1961; 1979) famously dismissed Frege’s assertion sign as a 
psychological hocus-pocus, which is “logically quite meaningless”. Other authors, 
including Reichenbach (1947) and Dummett (1993), by contrast, have defended the 
appeals to Frege’s assertion sign. The pragmatic sign of assertion certainly has some 
well-known expressive limitations, as it cannot be iterated and it cannot occur under 
the scope of a truth-conditional operator (Reichenbach 1947; Dummett 1981). We 
termed this limitation the Reichenbach Point. The result is that in Frege’s logical 
system, the assertion sign is always fixed at the beginning of any formula, followed 
by the content that is asserted. Consequently, in Frege’s system one may talk about 
the assertion of a disjunction or the assertion of a conjunction, for instance, but one 
cannot express the conjunction or disjunction of assertions. Connectives operating 
on assertions cannot semantically function in a truth-conditional fashion.  
However, nothing prevents connecting assertions in such a wise that is not 
truth-functional. Then it becomes possible to disambiguate, for instance, the 
assertion of a disjunction from the disjunction of assertions, among others.  
In Dalla Pozza (1991) and Dalla Pozza & Garola (1995), the strategy of 
appealing to non-truth-functional connectives operating over assertions is adopted.7 
This is the distinguished feature of the kind of pragmatic logic that is known as 
Logic for Pragmatics or Pragmatic Logic (LP for short). The basic idea of LP is to 
 
7 This is a distinguished feature of pragmatic logic. Extensions of LP to other illocutionary acts and 
applications to philosophical problems have been provided in (Carrara, Chiffi, De Florio 2016; Carrara, 
Chiffi, De Florio 2019; Carrara, Chiffi, De Florio, Pietarinen 2019) among others. For a classical bilateral 
system equipped with the signs of assertion and denial, see (Rumfitt 2000). An overview on many logical 
systems for assertion and denial is (Buekens et al. 2017). 
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connect logical formulas expressing assertions with intuitionistic-like operators, 
whereas the formulas expressing the content of a single assertion can be connected 
by classical truth-functional connectives. In short, in LP there are radical formulas 
such as p, q, α, which express contents of assertions. In order to get an elementary 
assertive, also known as sentential, formula, it should be prefixed by the assertion 
sign. For instance, ⊦ α is an elementary assertive formula stating that α is asserted. 
As in Frege’s system, it is possible to express the assertion of a conjunction as ⊦ (α ∧ 
β), or the assertion of a disjunction as ⊦ (α ∨ β), or the assertion of material 
implication as ⊦(α → β). But unlike in Frege’s case, in LP it is also possible to 
formulate the conjunction of assertions: (⊦ α) ⋂ (⊦ β); the disjunction of assertions: (⊦ 
α) ⋃ (⊦ β); and the implication of assertions: (⊦ α) ⊃ (⊦ β). All these can be done by 
introducing specific pragmatic connectives that apply to assertive formulas.  
In order to differentiate pragmatic connectives for assertive formulas from 
truth-functional connectives for radical formulas, Dalla Pozza & Garola (1995) 
expressed pragmatic connectives by signs taken from Łukasiewicz's or Polish logical 
notation. According to that approach, pragmatic conjunction, disjunction, negation 
and implication are indicated by the upper-case Latin letters K, A, C, N, respectively.8 
However, the resulting notation is a normal infix notation with parentheses. Polish 
symbols are merely used in order to provide an explicit distinction between two 
kinds of connectives, those for radical and those for assertive formulas. (In the 
subsequent literature on pragmatic logic, the use of Polish symbols was dropped by 
convention.) 
Radical formulas are evaluated in LP in the standard Tarskian way, while the 
meaning of pragmatic connectives is explicated by an assertion-based variant of the 
BHK (Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov) interpretation of intuitionistic constants. 
According to Heyting (1956), intuitionistic constants can indeed be explicated by 
means of the notion of assertion.9 An assertion expresses the construction (or the 
method of verification, demonstration, etc.) that yields a proof of a (propositional) 
content. Briefly put, P and Q being the contents, we have that:  
 
(i)  P and Q can be asserted iff both P and Q can be asserted. 
(ii) P or Q can be asserted iff at least one of the propositions P, Q can be 
asserted. 
(iii) ¬ P can be asserted iff one possesses a construction which, from the 
supposition that a construction for P were carried out, leads to a contradiction. 
(iv) P → Q can be asserted iff one possesses a construction R which, joined 
to any construction proving P would automatically effect a construction proving 
Q; that is, a proof of P, together with R, would form a proof of Q. 
 
Unlike in Heyting’s proposal, in LP there exists an explicit reference to the notion of 
justification of an assertion. An assertion, being an act, is not true or false but 
 
8 An eminent friend of Łukasiewicz’s notation was also Arthur Prior. 
9 Heyting (1930), translated in (Mancosu 1998), had pointed out that “to satisfy the intuitionistic 
demands, the assertion must be the realisation of the expectation expressed by the proposition p. Here, 
then, is the Brouwerian assertion of p: It is known how to prove p” (p. 308). For the role of assertion in 
contemporary constructivism, for instance in intuitionistic type theory, see (Martin-Löf 1984). 
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justified or unjustified. An elementary assertion ⊦ α can be considered justified, iff 
there exists an (intuitive) proof (conclusive evidence or verification) for the truth of 
the content α. In this framework, “the pragmatic notion of justification (or proof) 
presupposes the semantic notion of truth as a regulative concept, since, intuitively, a 
proof of a proposition amounts to a proof that its truth value is true” (Dalla Pozza 
and Garola 1995, p. 101).  
Let π be a pragmatic justification function from assertive formulas to the 
justification values indicated as “J” (justified) and “U” (unjustified). We can then 
state that (⊦ α) = J when there exists a proof of the truth of α. Notice that, if α is 
atomic, then the notion of intuitive proof has to be intended as an empirical 
verification that justifies the assertion, since a logical proof of an atomic formula 
cannot be given. In detail, the following justification rules apply to (complex) 
assertive formulas in LP: 
  
JR1 – Let α be a radical formula. Then: 
(JR1.1) π(α) = J iff a proof exists that α is true.  
(JR1.2) π(α) = U iff no proof exists that α is true.  
JR2 – Let δ be an assertive formula. Then:  
π(∼δ) = J iff a proof exists that δ is unjustified, i.e. that π(δ) = U.  
JR3 – Let δ1 and δ2 be assertive formulas. Then:  
(JR3.1) π(δ1 ∩ δ2) = J iff π(δ1) = J and π(δ2 ) = J; 
  (JR3.2) π(δ1 ∪ δ2) = J iff π(δ1) = J or π(δ2) = J;  
(JR3.3) π(δ1 ⊃ δ2) = J iff a proof exists that π(δ2 ) = J whenever π(δ1) = J. 
 
The justification function π is partial: it won’t assign a justification value to all 
complex formulas.10 This is in line with the intuitionistic flavour of the pragmatic 
connectives. Unlike truth-functions that can lead to truth or falsity, justification-
conditions reflect the idea that propositional content can be proven, its negation can 
be proven or it may be the case that a proof of it is lacking altogether.  
Pragmatic connectives operating on assertive formulas and truth-functional 
connectives operating on radical formulas are logically related by the following 
Bridge Principles: 
 
(a)  ⊦ (¬ α) ⊃ (∼ ⊦ (α)) 
(b)  ((⊦ α1) ∩ (⊦ α2)) ≡ (⊦ (α1 ∧ α2)) 
(c)  ((⊦ α1) ∪ (⊦ α2)) ⊃ (⊦ (α1 ∨ α2)) 
(d)  (⊦ (α1 → α2)) ⊃ (⊦ α1 ⊃ ⊦ α2). 
 
The principle (a) states that from the assertion of the negation of α it is possible to 
infer the pragmatic negation of α. Principle (b) shows that the conjunction of two 
assertions is equivalent to the assertion of a conjunction. As discussed before, this is 
 
10 In a strict sense, the function π depends on the semantic function used to evaluate radical 
formulas.  
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a fundamental property of normal logical systems for assertion. Formula (c) states 
that from the disjunction of two assertions it is possible to infer the assertion of the 
disjunction. Finally, principle (d) expresses the fact that from the assertion of a 
material implication α1 → α2, it is possible to derive that the assertion of α1  
pragmatically implies the assertion of α2. 
3. Diagrammatic Notations for Assertion 
 
3.1 Assertion and Existential Graphs  
Historically, an important contribution to the logic of assertions was set up in 
Peirce’s work on algebraic and graphical logics since 1880 (Pietarinen 2004, 2015). In 
his later works, he clearly endorsed the Geach Point, as follows from the statement 
that “[o]ne and the same proposition may be affirmed, denied, judged, doubted, 
inwardly inquired into, put as a question, wished, asked for, effectively commanded, 
taught, or merely expressed, and does not thereby become a different proposition” 
(R 517, c.1901).11 
Both in Peirce’s algebraic and graphical logics, writing a formula down on the 
sheet of paper is to make an assertion that the content of that formula or a graph is 
true in the universe of discourse that the sheet represents.12 Writing down a complex 
formula, such as a conditional, is to assert that such conditional relation obtains 
between the antecedent and consequent propositions in the conditional structure. It 
is not to assert the antecedent or to assert the consequent of that conditional 
structure. 
The key notion in Peirce’s logic is thus the sheet of assertion. The sheet is the 
surface (topologically, an open-compact, unoriented manifold) on which instances of 
assertions are scribed. Important thing is that the sheet itself is also an assertion. It 
asserts that in the dialogue between the ‘Graphist’ (Peirce’s term for the theoretical 
agent of our make-believe who proposes and defends assertions) and the 
‘Interpreter’ (the agent who interprets and accepts those assertions), the discourse is 
understood to run over a commonly accepted universe of discourse, the domain 
which  is taken to be common knowledge to both parties (R 517). The sheet is thus 
an assertion of the assumption of the common ground in communication (R 615, 
1908). These facts, Peirce explains, “render it certain that when I assert something, 
that is, endeavour by my utterances to induce you to recognize it as true, you will (if 
not invariably, at least sometimes) know what it is to which I intend to bring you to 
assent” (R 339, 1907; Peirce 2019: 620).  
This strikingly Gricean perspective has some important consequences. If 
scribing a proposition on the sheet is an assertion of it, and if the sheet itself is an 
assertion, then “the very first proposition that is scribed on the Sheet is scribed on a 
sheet already bearing a proposition” (R S-30, 1906). Expressing a proposition upon 
the sheet is indeed commonly and reciprocally understood to be asserted, and 
“whatever proposition is to be asserted shall be scribed on that sheet” (ibid.).  
 
11 This manuscript was ill-dated to 1904 in EP II and in the subsequent literature. 
12 Witness how Peirce had put this in R 650 (“Diversions of Definitions”, 1910): “Any shape or 
combination of shapes that put on the Sheet of Assertion would be an assertion, I term a graph, and your 
act of putting it on any surface by writing or drawing or a mixture of the two I express by saying that you 
scribe that sign on that area” (Peirce 2019: 164-165). 
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Now the assertion of ‘p’ by scribing it on the sheet is in fact also something 
more: it is to add or juxtapose the assertion of ‘p’ with a proposition which is already 
scribed upon the same sheet and hence already asserted. This is to affirm the 
presence of a well-understood and mutually agreed-upon universe of discourse of 
which ‘p’ is asserted. And this, then, means that whatever is laid upon the sheet as 
an assertion, is laid upon it independently of any other assertion that may have been 
scribed upon that same sheet. 
Peirce’s graphical method of logic thus leads to the assignment of a certain 
further signification to the notion of the sheet of assertion: it is not only a 
representation of a tautology (as a blank sheet in the propositional case, or the 
domain of discourse in the case of predicate logic, or the space of all proofs in 
intuitionistic logic, etc.). The sheet is at once also a representation of logical 
conjunction.  
It follows, for instance, that the equivalence expressed in the Bridge Principle 
(b) above is generically  assumed to hold in graphical logics even if the conjunction 
of an assertion cannot directly be expressed and only the equivalent assertion of 
conjunction is expressed. 
In Peirce’s graphical logic, the Dudman Point clearly holds, too, since 
assertion is notationally represented by the sheet of assertion. But the sheet is not a 
sign specific to assertions, so the Frege Point does not hold. And since assertions 
juxtaposed on the sheet are connected by logical conjunctions (and in Peirce’s 
graphical logic of EGs this is effected by the device of the “cuts” and hence 
connected by other truth-functional logical connectives), the Reichenbach Point does 
not hold, either. The Elementary-restriction Point remains indeterminate, in so far as 
the basic and standard system of logical graphs is concerned (namely the Alpha part 
of EGs), as those agree with the Boolean algebra (Ma & Pietarinen 2018a) and have 
only the classical, truth-functional connectives in their repertoire. (But see Ma & 
Pietarinen 2018b,c for some non-classical modifications and extensions of the Alpha 
part.) 
We can summarise the upshot of these considerations and arguments—which 
Peirce presents in a much greater length in his writings that can be covered here—in 
terms of the following, 
(vii) The Peirce Point: In any conceivable logical notation, you need to write 
down (scribe) what you assert.  
According to the Peirce Point, there is nothing (no propositions in logic, 
abstract forms in topology, concepts in cognition, etc.) that could be expressed 
without writing or scribing them down on something. A representation of that thing 
in some media, manifold, space, imagination or cognitive schema is necessary. The 
form of such representation thus becomes the first and indispensable sign of all  
logical notations. 
In the next section, we see how to modify such  system of logical graphs to 
be consistent with the Dalla Pozza Point. 
 
3.2 Assertion and Assertive Graphs   
A new logical system of assertions inspired by EGs is Assertive Graphs (AGs) 
(Bellucci, Chiffi, Pietarinen 2018; Pietarinen and Chiffi 2018). AGs explicitly have 
assertions as elements of its language. Similarly to EGs, there is no specific sign for 
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assertion, since propositional letters are in the language of AGs scribed on the sheet 
of assertion just as they are in the language of EGs. That sheet itself is both an 
assertion and a representation of the universe of discourse. Anything scribed on the 
sheet is asserted. The blank sheet expresses the collection of all justified assertions, 
analogously to the sheet of assertion in EGs in which it expresses tautology, the set 
of all truths.  
Unlike EGs, the system of AGs has an intuitionistic flavour. It operates on 
asserted formulas in the sense of the aforementioned assertion-based variant of the 
BHK interpretation of intuitionistic constants. Because of this, all connective types 
are primitive signs of AGs, since unlike in the classical case of EGs, those 
connectives are not fully inter-definable. Moreover, there is no cut in AGs, which 
implies that there are less subgraphs to be nested to express complex formulas. 
Compared to EGs, this improves  readability of complex formulas of AGs. 
The main conventions and elements of the language of AGs are the following. 
Writing P on the sheet of assertion means that P is a justified assertion (Fig. I). 
 
 
P 
 
Figure I   
 
Surrounding P with a thinly-lined box is a technical device that help us to focus on 
certain formula, much in the same way as we may do by parentheses. This means 
that the box has the role of grouping those asserted formulas together that are 
enclosed within the box (Fig. II). 
 
 
Figure II 
 
Conjunction is scribed by juxtaposing the formula P and the formula Q (Fig. III). 
 
P     Q 
 
Figure III 
 
The graph in Figure III is equivalent to the following graph in which P and Q are 
boxed (Fig. IV): 
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Figure IV 
 
However, since -- and as we have already seen above -- in logical systems for 
assertions the assertion of a conjunction is equivalent to the conjunction of 
assertions, it follows that the graph of Figure IV is equivalent to the graph of Figure 
V: 
 
 
Figure V 
 
A disjunction of assertions is represented by the graph of Figure VI, namely by 
adding a line (with a cross-mark to make it resemble the traditional ‘+’ sign of 
disjunction) connecting two assertions such as the two boxed graphs in Figure VI: 
 
 
Figure VI 
 
The implication of two assertions is expressed by the construction presented in 
Figure VII, and termed a cornering. Given the intuitionistic flavour of AGs, this 
conditional is not a material implication but a constructive conditional. From the 
assertion of P it is possible to conclude to the assertion of Q. 
 
 
Figure VII 
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The last primitive notational element of AGs is the sign of absurdum, indicated by 
“●”, and called “the blot”. The graph of Figure VIII indicates an assertion that is 
always false and never justified. It is a pseudo-assertion. 
 
 
      Figure VIII 
 
In EGs cuts are used to express also (classical) negation, besides other functions 
such as grouping and order of interpretation. In AGs there is no primitive sign 
expressing negation. Instead, negation is expressed as the fact that a formula implies 
the absurdum. Therefore, the assertion of ‘not P’ is expressed as depicted in Figure 
IX: 
 
 
Figure IX 
 
The definition of the deducibility relation and the set of rules of transformations 
have been presented and discussed in more detail in Bellucci, Chiffi, and Pietarinen 
(2018) and in Pietarinen and Chiffi (2020). They result in a true deep-inference of the 
proof rules in the system of AGs (Ma & Pietarinen 2019). Here, we add a few remarks 
on the notational aspects of the system.  
As noted, AGs is a system with a precise intended interpretation. It is not 
serving only as a calculus but as a system that conveys intended interpretations to 
formulas on the basis of the notion of assertion. This implies that the syntactical 
(diagrammatical) features of AGs are guided by some relatively strong 
semantic/pragmatic intuitions to do with pre-formal aspects of reasoning. According 
to this view, inference takes place among acts of assertions. (This is quite along the 
fashion of Frege’s works). The notion of inference is a crucial ingredient of the 
logical system, supplanting the semantic notion of logical consequence. Unlike in 
Dalla Pozza’s system of pragmatic logic, however, the justification value of an 
assertion in AGs is not explicit, since everything that sits on the sheet of assertion 
has to be considered as justified. The only exception is the assertion of the 
absurdum, i.e. the pseudo-assertion of the blot, which is devoid of any such 
justification.13 
 
13 See Bellucci & Pietarinen (2017) on how denials contrast with (justified) assertions and how they 
are notationally played out in the graphical systems of EGs. 
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 Finally, it is possible to notationally differentiate  the assertion of the 
conjunction of two propositions (Figure IV) from that the conjunction of two 
assertions (Figure V). This validates the Dalla Pozza Point according to which  logical 
connectives are to have an intuitionistic basis. Given an intuitionistic basis of the 
logical constants of the theory of AGs, the assertion of a disjunction of propositions 
cannot be directly expressed, for example.14  
4. Comparison from the Point of View of Philosophy of 
Notation 
Let us revisit the seven points delineated in the introduction, summarised here: 
(i) The Geach Point: One and the same proposition can occur both asserted and 
unasserted in different contexts. 
(ii) The Dudman Point: The distinction between asserted and unasserted 
propositions should be notationally distinguished, whatever form the notational 
expression of this difference happens to take. 
(iii) The Frege Point: Assertion must be represented by a specific logical sign.  
(iv) The Reichenbach Point: Assertions cannot be iterated and they cannot be 
connected by truth-functional connectives.  
(v) The Elementary-restriction Point: No connective (of any sort) is ever applied 
to different assertions. 
(vi) The Dalla Pozza Point: Complex assertions may be logically combined by an 
application of intuitionistic-like connectives.  
And finally, let us derive a notational generalisation of these points from the 
previous considerations: 
(vii) The Peirce Point: In any conceivable logical notation, you need to write 
down (or scribe) what you assert. 
This scribing of propositions as assertions of them is implemented in the theory of 
logical graphs in terms of the sheet of assertion.15  
 
14 Nonetheless, a classical variant of AGs has been proposed (Pietarinen & Chiffi 2019), in order to 
deal with classical principles. This consists in extending AGs with the rule called “elimination of 
coincident corners” (ECC); a rule that  amounts to the rule of elimination of double negation. However, 
this strategy imposes a global re-interpretation of assertive formulas of AGs in a classical sense. If so, 
then all formulas have to be interpreted as a single assertion of different propositions, along the lines of 
classical systems of Frege, Reichenbach and Peirce. Only in Dalla Pozza’s pragmatic logic are all the 
propositional and assertive connectives fully notationally disambiguated while logically related, as 
attested by the Bridge Principles (a)-(d). 
15 The notion of the sheet of assertion is not an exclusive property of graphical notations. Peirce used the 
notion of the sheet in his general algebra of logic, before the advent of logical graphs in 1896. The 
transitions between algebraic and graphical points of view were without much difference for Peirce. 
Sometimes he employs terminology in the logic of the algebra of the copula that may be more familiar 
from his theory of logical graphs (such as “scriptibility”, “sheet of assertion”). For example, in the context 
of the Minute Logic (R 430, manuscript page 70, 1902), the writing down of a proposition “on some duly 
validated sheet of assertions” makes the proposition so uttered an assertion that “becomes a binding act”. 
This “we will pretend” to be so “[f]or the sake of fixing our ideas”, he further states (ibid.). The 
supposition that one takes there to be the “sheet” upon which an utterance or writing down of a 
proposition makes it an act of assertion is common in Peirce’s algebra of logic just as it is in his graphical 
method (see Pietarinen 2019). Likewise is the application of the term “to scribe” or “scriptibility” (R 501): 
any algebraic or graphical constituent that has a signification by virtue of the fact that it has been 
asserted as having that signification, is said to be scriptible whenever “it is applicable to V, the veritas, in 
some understood sense” (ibid.). 
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Our analysis supports the following interrelations. Frege accepts 
 
● (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v), but not (vi): Frege does not accept that complex 
assertions may be logically combined by an application of intuitionistic-like 
connectives. 
Dalla Pozza, instead, accepts:  
 
● (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (vi), but not (v). He does not accept that any connective (of 
any sort) is ever applied to different assertions.  
Peirce with his Existential Graphs accepts:  
 
● (i) and (ii), but not (iii), (iv) or (vi). Peirce does not accept that an assertion 
must be represented by a specific logical sign, or that assertions cannot be 
iterated and cannot be connected by truth-functional connectives. He does 
not  explicitly consider that complex assertions may be logically combined by 
an application of intuitionistic-like connectives.  
 
Finally, in the framework of Assertive Graphs we have that: 
 
● (i), (ii), (iii, with qualifications), (iv), and (vi) hold, while (v) does not, that is, 
that no one connective (of any sort) is ever applied to different assertions. 
 
According to this analysis, the question of finding good notations for assertions has 
not so much to do on adding new signs to the vocabulary to capture assertions than 
it has on finding notationally economic means of expressing (acts of) assertion, as 
acts of writing down  propositions as formulas and graphs. In this way, the sheet on 
which we scribe assertions is at the same time both (i) a representation that an 
assertion has been made, (ii) a proposition (expressing ‘all truths’, ‘all assertions’, ‘all 
transformations’, ‘all proofs’ etc., depending on the intended interpretations of 
underlying logical systems), and (iii) a sign of a logical connective (typically, that of a 
logical conjunction).  
5. Conclusion 
The pragmatic notion of assertion plays an important role in different logical 
systems, either explicitly or implicitly. Frege’s Begriffsschrift, Peirce’s Existential 
Graphs and Heyting’s explication of intuitionistic constants are examples of such 
pragmatically motivated approaches. In this paper, the key pragmatic and notational 
aspects were considered, taking into account both (i) systems that explicitly express 
logical assertions introducing a specific sign of assertion, in particular (a) Frege’s 
logical system and (b) Dalla Pozza’s pragmatic logic, and (ii) those systems where no 
specific or ad hoc sign for assertion is introduced, in particular (c) Peirce’s Existential 
Graphs and (d) its recently developed variant of Assertive Graphs. It was found that 
the question of finding the best notation for assertions has not so much to do on 
adding new signs to the vocabulary than finding  notationally economic means of 
expressing assertion as acts of scribing or writing down logical formulas. The way 
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this works in the fashion of intuitionistic logic is implemented in the theory of 
Assertive Graphs. 
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